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WHICH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN A 10b-5 ACTION?
By GERALD RASKIN,* JAY W. ENYART**
INTRODUCTION
In the 1946 case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.' a federal
court first implied a private right of action for violation of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act")' and
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.' The United States Supreme Court later upheld that
decision, and removed any doubt as to the right,4 in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
5
No federal statute, however, limits civil actions brought
*Member, Hindry & Meyer, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1962, City College of New York;
LL.B., 1965, Columbia University.
**Associate, Hindry & Meyer, Denver, Colorado; B.S.B.A., 1967, Northwestern Uni-
versity; J.D., 1971, University of Colorado.
'69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
215 U.S.C. § 78j (1958):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contrav-
ention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.
317 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
'Ruder, Civil Liability Under lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 627 (1963).
5404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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under section 10(b)l "since at the time the Act was passed there
was little indication that the courts would imply a private cause
of action based upon it [section 10(b)]." 7 As a result the courts
have been continually confronted with the problem of determin-
ing which limitation period should be applicable to a rule 10b-5
action. Understandably, this has led to confusion among the cir-
cuits, among district courts sitting within single circuits, and
even among district courts sitting in the same state.'
Although Congress did not specify a section 10(b) statute of
limitations, it did enact limitation periods for actions brought
pursuant to those sections of the 1934 Act expressly creating civil
liability. Sections 9(e), 18(c) and 29(b) contain statutes of limita-
tion of 1 year from discovery (but in no event longer than 3 years
from the date of violation), and section 16(b) has a 2-year-from-
violation statute.9 Thus, when Congress was considering the 1934
Act, it determined that a relatively short limitation period should
govern the timeliness of claims under the express civil remedies
sections. Although this legislative history is well known and has
been forcefully argued, 0 the courts have rarely considered the
relatively simple and logical position that congressional purpose
would best be effectuated by applying to section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 actions a limitation period prescribed elsewhere in the
Act." That position has been rejected, in fact, by the few courts
which have squarely confronted it."
'Contrast section 10(b) with the Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(a), 12(1), (2), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k(a), l(1), (2) (1971) and with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 16(b),
18, 29(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), p(b), r, cc(b) (1971). In each of the latter sections civil
liability is expressly created and a statute of limitations provided for.
'Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Minn. 1973).
'Recently, for example, the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to determine the
applicable 10b-5 limitation period on the grounds that the members of the court (two
judges having excused themselves) were not able to agree. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
874 (1973).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18, 29(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), p(b),
r, cc(b) (1970).
"Schulman, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: Complication Added to
Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 635 (1967).
"The liability of insiders for shortswing profits made in transactions involving the
issuer's equity securities under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act is designed to be prophylactic
only. The other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are designed to be prophylactic as well
as remedial. Id. at 638. Therefore, the 2-year statute provided in section 16(b) is not
considered in this article, which deals with the remedial aspects of the federal securities
laws. Cf. 6 L. Loss, SECURIEs REGULATION 3900 (Supp. 1969).
"Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Inves., Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971) (refusing to
apply limitations period found in section 29(b) of the 1934 Act on grounds that the period
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Since the courts have refused to look to the federal securities
laws for a rule 10b-5 limitation period, and since the authors
cannot agree with those who maintain that the appropriate rule
10b-5 limitation period is that applied by the forum state to ac-
tions in fraud, it is proposed that federal courts adopt the period
of limitations provided in the blue sky law of the forum state but
apply in each instance the federal tolling policy 4 so that the
limitation period will not commence to run until the violation is,
or reasonably should have been, discovered by the 10b-5 plaintiff.
Such an approach would provide litigants with an objective
method of determining the applicable limitation period regard-
less of the situs of the forum and would resolve the confusion and
uncertainty which currently exist.
I. SURVEY OF RECENT CASES
The limitation period most commonly applied to rule 10b-5
actions is that which the forum state, either by statute or by
judicial decision, applies to actions in fraud. 5 However, since
1970 several courts have applied the limitation period found in
the forum state's blue sky law. 6 Violations involving misrepresen-
tation or omission of material fact made actionable by the state
blue sky laws may be divided into three categories: (1) Based
upon rule 10b-5; (2) based upon section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform
Securities Act; 7 and (3) based upon other standards, particularly
those designed to regulate the registration of securities rather
than to govern individual securities transactions.
applies only to actions brought in reliance on that section); Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Minn. 1973) (on grounds that such action may only
properly be taken by Congress or the Supreme Court).
"Note, Statutes of Limitations in lOb-5 Actions, 39 U. Mo. K.C.L. Rv. 283, 296
(1970-71).
"See text accompanying note 30 infra. Martin, Statutes of Limitation in lOb-5 Ac-
tions: Which State Statute is Applicable?, 29 Bus. LAWYER 369 (1974) concludes that
although the state blue sky statutes of limitation should apply in 10b-5 actions, the federal
tolling doctrine should be abandoned.
i"See Note supra note 13, at 287 n.25.
"E.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970).
'"Uniform Securities Act § 410(a)(2) reads as follows:
(a) any person who
(2) offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or
omission), and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
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A. The Sixth Circuit
The first appellate court to carefully consider the possible
application of a blue sky limitation period to a rule 10b-5 action
was the Sixth Circuit in Charney v. Thomas. 8 In Charney, the
court below had applied the Michigan blue sky limitation period
(2 years from contract of sale), and dismissed the action. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that, since the Michigan blue
sky law contains no provision similar to rule 10b-5, the state 6-
year fraud statute was applicable notwithstanding that rule 10b-
5 and Michigan common law fraud actions are not entirely simi-
lar. While conceding that the blue sky limitation period might be
applicable under different circumstances, the court appears to
have been swayed by the fact that no court had ever applied the
local blue sky law limitation period in a 10b-5 action. 9
Charney was followed in Denny v. Performance Systems,
Inc.,' where the district court, when faced with the choice of
applying the Tennessee blue sky statute (1 year from date of
contract) or the 10-year general limitation period, chose the lat-
ter. It did so on the grounds that, for fraudulent securities trans-
actions, the state blue sky law provided a remedy of rescission
only. Because the plaintiffs were seeking damages rather than
rescission, this action, the court reasoned, would have been sub-
ject to the general limitation period if brought in state court.
B. The Eighth Circuit
The first appellate decision to actually apply the blue sky
limitation period was the Eighth Circuit case of Vanderboom v.
Sexton.2' In formulating the test to determine which limitation
period should apply, the Vanderboom court relied upon two basic
propositions, now established in the law of rule 10b-5: (1) Where
a right of action in fraud is created based upon federal legislation,
it is federal policy to adopt an appropriate local law of limita-
know, and, in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
untruth or omission, is liable to the person buying the security from him, who
may sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the
security, together with interest at six percent per year from the date of
payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of any in-
come received on the security, upon the tender of the security, or for damages
if he no longer owns the security.
1372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967).
"Id. at 100. The Charney opinion contains no discussion of the federal tolling policy.
"[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,387 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
21422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
VOL. 51
10b-5 ACTION
tions, generally looking to the forum state;2 and (2) the federal
court should apply the local limitation period which best effec-
tuates federal policy.
23
Arkansas, the forum state, had adopted section 410(a)(2) of
the Uniform Securities Act, 4 which section is substantially the
same as section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"). 5
Both sections impose liability upon a seller of securities who mis-
represents or omits necessary material facts unless the seller
proves that he did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable
care, could not have known of the untruths or omissions. Thus,
under Arkansas law, a seller may be held civilly liable for his mere
negligence .
2
At the outset the Vanderboom court indicated its preference
for the short blue sky statute of limitations on the grounds that
"it deals expressly with the sale of securities" 7 and "ordinarily
would be the most reasonable and logical type of statute to apply
to essentially what might be termed an 'implied federal blue-sky'
type of statutory action. '2 Apparently deeming this rationale
insufficient, the court went on to focus on the elements of plain-
tiff's cause of action as determining "the local statute which bears
the closest resemblance to the federal statute involved. '29 Where
"UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S.
461 (1947); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). Rule applicable to 10b-5 action:
Aboussie v. Aboussie, 446 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1971); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Invs., Inc.,
440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 852 (1970); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967). On the question of
choice of law see 6 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3900-01 (Supp. 1969); Dyer v. Eastern
Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Me. 1971) (law of State of Maine appropriate
source of 10b-5 limitation period since Maine was forum state, the parties resided there
and the alleged violation occurred in Maine).
"UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills,
Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967); Corey v.
Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. W. Va. 1973); Josefs of Palm Beach, Inc. v.
Southern Inv. Co., 349 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp.
997 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
"Arkansas Securities Act of 1959, § 22 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256 (1966).
"Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1958).
"Both section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act and section 12(2) of the 1933
Act limit the civil remedy to buyers of securities whereas section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have
been made equally available to sellers and buyers. This distinction, however, should not
preclude federal courts from applying blue sky limitations to 10b-5 actions since state law
dealing specifically with securities transactions would be a logical source of a limitation
period for its federal counterpart.




there was the "closest resemblance," federal policy presumably
was best effectuated. The court noted specifically that, in the
Eighth Circuit, negligent and intentional misrepresentation are
equally actionable under rule 10b-5 and section 410(a)(2) of the
Uniform Securities Act. Common law fraud in the state of Arkan-
sas, however, requires a showing of scienter. Although recognizing
that rule 10b-5 and the civil liability section of the Arkansas blue
sky law are not identical, the court concluded that since the blue
sky law and rule 10b-5 share a common purpose (affording a civil
remedy in cases of securities fraud), and since neither requires a
showing of scienter, the 2-year statute of limitations provided in
the Arkansas blue sky law should govern in rule 10b-5 actions.
At this point the circuit court diverged from the lower court,
which had held that, as provided in the state blue sky law, the
limitation period began running on the date of the contract of
sale. The circuit court relied instead on the federal doctrine, first
announced in Bailey v. Glover,30 that in cases involving fraud the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is, or
should have been, discovered. This principle has been held to
apply to actions at law as well as equity3' and is now well settled
under rule 10b-5 decisions.32 Thus, both federal policies-the toll-
ing doctrine and the remedial nature of the federal securities
laws-"would best be served by making any statute of limitations
run only from the date of discovery of the'fraud or from the date
the fraud upon reasonable inquiry should have been discov-
ered. '33 Application of the tolling doctrine on the Vanderboom
facts saved the plaintiffs' rule 10b-5 claims for relief.
Variation in the scope and interpretation of state blue sky
laws has led, in the Eighth Circuit, to a different holding under
the Vanderboom resemblance test. In Klapmeier v. Peat, Mar-
wick, Mitchell & Co.,34 the district court applied the Minnesota
-88 U.S. 342 (1874).
I'Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 821 (1961).
"United California Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004
(1973); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 445 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972); Aboussie v.
Aboussie, 446 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1971); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967);
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Kramer v.
Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553
(D. Md. 1971).
"422 F.2d at 1240.
u363 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Minn. 1973).
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common law fraud statute of limitations in a 10b-5 action. Ac-
knowledging that Vanderboom requires careful consideration of
the limitation period required by the forum state for securities
violations, 35 and that Vanderboom suggests that a short statute
is preferable," the court nonetheless found that, because Minne-
sota does not require scienter in common law fraud cases, and
because Minnesota securities regulation is aimed at registration
rather than individual transactions, a Minnesota fraud action,
rather than a state blue sky claim, more closely resembles a rule
10b-5 action. If the district court adheres to its analysis in
Klapmeier, however, it may be obligated to reverse its position
as Minnesota has since enacted a new blue sky law defining ac-
tionable violations in terms almost identical to rule 10b-5, but
retaining the "exercise of reasonable care" defense of section
410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act.
37
C. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Parrent v. Midwest
Rug Mills, Inc. ,8 has recently held that the state blue sky limita-
tion period (3 years), rather than the state general statute of
limitations (5 years) construed by state judicial decision to apply
to actions in fraud, should be applied in a rule 10b-5 action. The
securities law of the forum state, here Illinois, gives buyers of
securities a right of rescission for violations identical in substance
to the conduct prohibited by rule 10b-5. 9 Thus, as to the purposes
of the respective statutes, the resemblance test formulated by the
Charney and Vanderboom courts was satisfied. Moreover,
[tihe three year limitation period is also closer to the express limi-
tation periods in the various sections of the federal act, noted above
in note 3 [Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970), and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 18, 29(b), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78ie, r, cc (1970)]. Furthermore, logic dictates selection of the
three year Illinois limitation as tending more toward an orderly de-
velopment of law, then reaching into a different Illinois act ... for
the appropriate limitation."
The commonality of purposes and defenses test set forth in
Vanderboom was further met in that neither statute contains the
'Id. at 1214.
'11d. at 1217.
rMINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.23 (Supp. 1974) (effective Aug. 1, 1973).
-8455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).
"Illinois Securities Act § 12, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.12 (1971).
4455 F.2d at 127.
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defense that the seller "did not know and in the exercise of rea-
sonable care could not have known" of the misrepresentation.4'
Since Parrent expressly approved the Vanderboom court's inter-
pretation of rule 10b-5,42 it would therefore follow that scienter is
not an element of a rule 10b-5 action in the Seventh Circuit, and
at least one district court sitting in that circuit has so concluded.43
Finally, the Parrent court applied the federal tolling doctrine so
that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the
plaintiff discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the fraud.
In Kramer v. Loewi & Co.,44 the district court decision re-
ferred to above, the Wisconsin blue sky law limitation period,45
rather than the 6-year state fraud limitation, was applied to a rule
10b-5 action. Interpreting Parrent to hold that in the Seventh
Circuit scienter is not a necessary element of a rule 10b-5 action,
the court found that a rule 10b-5 action more resembles an action
under the state blue sky law than a common law fraud claim,
where a showing of scienter is required. The Kramer court com-
pared the civil liability section of the "new" Wisconsin blue sky
law (based upon section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act)4"
to clause (2) of rule 10b-5, finding that both make unlawful the
same activities. Moreover, "the broader liability under 10b-5 sup-
posedly makes a shorter limitations period appropriate."47 This
court also applied the federal tolling doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, has apparently abrogated
any scienter requirement in rule 10b-5 actions and, using that as
a stepping stone, has in Parrent and Kramer found the applicable
10b-5 limitation period to be that provided by the state blue sky
law. The resemblance test in both cases was satisfied notwith-
standing that the language of the Illinois law is virtually identical
"Id.
"Id. at 126.
"Kramer v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
"4Id.
'As to violations occurring prior to January 1, 1970, 3 years from the date the violation
was or, with reasonable inquiry, should have been discovered (under old blue sky law
providing limitation period of 3 years after contract of sale); as to violations occurring after
January 1, 1970, 1 year after violation is, or reasonably should have been, discovered
(under new blue sky law, Wis. STAT., § 551.59(5) (1971), providing a limitation period of
3 years after the date of violation or 1 year after discovery of the violation, whichever first
occurs).
4"WIs. STAT. § 551.59(2) (1971).
"357 F. Supp. at 86.
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to that of rule 10b-5, and the language of the Wisconsin statute
parallels that of section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act.
D. The Ninth Circuit
Even though scienter is not a necessary element of a rule 10b-
5 action in the Ninth Circuit,48 that circuit has declined to adopt
the Eighth Circuit's resemblance test and continues to apply in-
stead the forum state's fraud statute of limitations. The leading
Ninth Circuit case is Fratt v. Robinson," where the court selected
the Washington state limitation period applicable to fraud ac-
tions (3 years from discovery of the fraud), rather than that appli-
cable to an action to recover on a liability created by statute (2
years after accrual of the cause of action), in a rule 10b-5 action."
Subsequent to the Fratt decision the Washington state legis-
lature enacted a statute affording any person purchasing a secu-
rity "by means of fraud or misrepresentation" a right of action
against the seller. 5' Although this section resembles section 410 of
the Uniform Securities Act, the exclusivity portion, which denies
the creation of causes of action not specified in the section, is
conspicuously absent.52 Thus, courts may reasonably be expected
to imply a civil remedy for violation of that section of the Wash-
ington blue sky law, which is identical in substance to rule 10b-
5.53 Since the limitation period in the civil liability section (3
years after the contract of sale) is identical to that provided by
the fraud statute (excepting the tolling provision), the court in
Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Investments, Inc.," when asked to
apply the Washington blue sky limitation period, could have
declined to do so merely on the grounds that application of the
federal tolling policy would lead to the same result. However, the
court decided that the fraud limitation period, which would begin
to run from discovery, was superior to the blue sky limitation
period, which would begin to run from the contract date. More
"Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
41203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
'Id. at 635.
"WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1973).
"Uniform Securities Act § 410(h):
The rights and remedies provided by this act are in addition to any other
rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity, but this act does not
create any cause of action not specified in this section or section 202(e)
[relating to actions on surety bonds required of registered broker-dealers and
investment advisors].
'3See note 2 supra.
-440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971).
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importantly, however, the court, in declining to adopt the blue
sky limitation period, stated:
[Flor us to change the applicable limitation period because the
local law of securities regulation has changed would add an unneces-
sary uncertainty to the prosecution of federal claims under section
10(b). We do not believe federal policy is advanced by changing the
law governing the timeliness of federal claims to correspond with
each change in the substantive elements of a claim under the local
securities law. Aggrieved persons have come to rely upon our prior
holdings. Reasonable stability in laws pertaining to voluntary rela-
tionships between parties, and the right of access to the courts to
question those relationships, is a worthwhile objective as well."
This language has since been the basis upon which the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has refused to alter its position that the
fraud limitation period applies to rule 10b-5 actions. In Turner
v. Lundquist,58 the Ninth Circuit, on the authority of Fratt,
adopted the California fraud statute of limitations (3 years from
the date of discovery of the fraud) and applied it to an action in
which California was the source of the local law. After the Turner
decision was announced, the California legislature enacted a new
blue sky law,57 which provides for civil liability under circumstan-
ces similar to those described in section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform
Securities Act. The applicable blue sky limitation period, how-
ever, is 1 year after discovery of the facts constituting the viola-
tion, but in no event longer than 4 years after the violation.' The
circuit court, in Mansfield Mills, Inc. v. Coward," declined a
petition on interlocutory appeal on the basis that the petitioner
failed to distinguish Douglass and that the broad remedial pur-
poses of the federal securities laws were not to be narrowed by a
state statute of limitations.
Undaunted by the Ninth Circuit's stand on rule 10b-5 limita-
tion periods, another aggrieved defendant, in United California
Bank v. Salik,10 was informed by the court of appeals that, not-
withstanding the fact that the new California blue sky law civil
liability section was similar to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the
court would continue to apply the state fraud limitation period
"Id. at 916.
w377 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1967).
"CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25804 (West Supp. 1974).
wId. § 25506.
"[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,693 (9th Cir. 1972) (peti-
tion for permission to appeal from interlocutory order denying motion to dismiss).
-481 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973).
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rather than the 1-year blue sky limitation period. It reasoned that
federal policy is advanced by stability in laws governing timeli-
ness of federal claims, the broad remedial policies of the federal
securities laws are best served by a longer rather than a shorter
statute of limitations, and adoption of the blue sky limitation
period would necessarily be piecemeal since the federal tolling
policy would dictate elimination of the 4-year maximum, and
"piecemeal adoption of the new statute is hardly preferable to
continuing utilization of the older fraud statutes."'" No consider-
ation was given to the argument that, since the California blue
sky limitation period is nearly identical with the periods provided
in the civil liabilities sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,6" the
court, under the theory advanced by one writer,63 could have best
implemented federal policy by adopting the California blue sky
limitation period in toto.
E. The Fifth Circuit
Courts in the Fifth Circuit also have differed as to the appro-
priate rule 10b-5 limitation period. In the last 2 years, courts in
that circuit have reached contrary conclusions even when looking
to the law of the same state for the appropriate limitation period.
In Aboussie v. Aboussie,u the parties apparently agreed that
the 2-year Texas statute of limitations for fraud, misrepresen-
tation, or deceit should be applied in a rule 10b-5 action. The only
controversy in that case centered upon the time of commence-
ment of that period.
The civil liabilities section of the Texas Securities Act" is
virtually identical with section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securi-
ties Act. The district court in Richardson v. Salinas"6 recognized
that there are major differences between rule 10b-5 and the civil
liability section of the Texas Securities Act, but concluded that
"Id. at 1015.
"Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(a), 12(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. §8 77k(a), l(1), (2) (1971);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 10(b), 16(b), 18, 29(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), p(b),
r, cc(b) (1971).
13Schulman, supra note 10.
"446 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc. [Current Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,496 (5th Cir. April 11, 1974) (declining to rule on applicability
of Florida blue sky limitation period to a rule lOb-5 action on grounds that transferee court
must apply state law, here that of New York, which would have been applied by transferor
court).
"TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(2) (1964).
"336 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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the terminology of the latter section corresponds to clause (2) of
the rule. Texas state courts have applied a 2-year-from-violation
limitation period in fraud actions. On the other hand, the Texas
blue sky period of limitations is 3 years after the contract of sale."
The Richardson court chose the blue sky limitation period as
controlling on the 10b-5 claim since the blue sky law is closer in
substance and purpose to rule 10b-5 than other statutes consid-
ered, application of the blue sky statute of limitations appears to
be the "natural choice," and application of the blue sky statute
of limitations would give rule 10b-5 plaintiffs a longer period in
which to bring an action.
Section 517.21 of the Florida Securities Act provides in part
that "every sale made in violation of any of the provisions of this
chapter shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser . ",
Section 517.301(1) of that act is identical in substance to rule 10b-
569 Therefore, applying the resemblance test as an indication of
best effectuation of federal policy, it might seem that, in a rule
10b-5 action, a Florida district court would apply the blue sky
limitation period (2 years). However, the middle and southern
district courts of Florida have split on this question. In Beefy
Trail Inc. v. Beefy King International,° the court, in reliance
upon Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat7 and A boussie, which did not
consider the applicability of a blue sky limitation period, held
that it was bound to apply the 3-year Florida fraud statute of
limitations to a 10b-5 claim for relief. A few months later the
district court in Josef's of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Southern Invest-
ment Co.,7" held that the Florida blue sky statute of limitations
rather than the state fraud statute of limitations applied in a rule
10b-5 action. The court was mindful of the dictum in Azalea
Meats that the state limitation period used in a 10b-5 action
should not be shorter than that applicable to a similar common
law fraud action.7 3 However, this statement was dismissed as in-
apposite, and the court, following the logic of Parrent4 and
67
EX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(c) (1964).
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.21 (1971).
'FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.301(1) (1972).
7348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
71386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967).
"349 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
"Id. at 1060-61.
74455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Vanderboom,75 found the Florida blue sky limitation period the
most appropriate to apply.
F. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has declined to alter its position that the
state fraud limitation period applies to rule 10b-5 claims for re-
lief,7" and has distinguished Vanderboom on the grounds that,
while the Eighth Circuit has abrogated any scienter requirement
in rule 10b-5 actions, the Tenth Circuit has not." This is an
apparent inconsistency, as the Tenth Circuit has made available
to rule 10b-5 defendants the defense set forth in section 12(2) of
the 1933 Act (and section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act)
that they did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known of the misrepresentation or omission.7
Thus, 10b-5 defendants in the Tenth Circuit may escape liability
by proving that, inter alia, they were not negligent. This shifting
of the burden placed upon the plaintiff at common law to the
defendant under rule 10b-5, as construed, was recently reaffirmed
without comment in Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp.79
G. Other Circuits
Several district courts sitting in circuits other than those
discussed above have elected recently to apply the blue sky limi-
tation period rather than the fraud statute of limitations. In each
of these cases the forum state had a civil liabilities section which
was substantially the same as section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform
Securities Act. However, in each case the limitation period var-
ied. In Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co.,8" the Maine blue
sky limitation period was 2 years after the contract of sale. The
court, however, applied the federal tolling doctrine. In Batchelor
v. Legg & Co.,8 the applicable Maryland blue sky limitation
75422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 582 (1970).
"Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964) (refusing to
apply Colorado blue sky limitation period on grounds that while rule lOb-5 requires proof
of scienter and reliance, the civil liability section of the state blue sky law does not).
"Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 104 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971).
"Id. at 102.
71474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973). The following decisions, however, require that a 10b-
5 plaintiff prove scienter: Allen v. H.K. Porter Co., 452 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir. 1971);
Jensen v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131, 133 (10th Cir. 1968); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,
228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
0336 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Me. 1971).
852 F.R.D. 553 (D. Md. 1971).
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period was 2 years after the contract of sale. 2 The court relied on
Vanderboom, without any discussion of the resemblance test, in
support of its application of the blue sky limitation period, con-
centrating its attention on the federal tolling doctrine which it
also applied. Finally, in Corey v. Bache & Co., Inc.,81 the District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, applying Indi-
ana law, s4 noted that the trend is to apply rule 10b-5 to negligent
as well as to intentional misrepresentation. Accordingly, since
"the nature of the alleged Wrongs does not amount to the ele-
ments of common-law fraud,"85 the 2-year blue sky limitation
period was deemed to best effectuate the policies of rule 10b-5.
II. PRESENT CRITERIA CANNOT LEAD TO STABILITY AND UNIFORMITY
This confusion among the circuits has been created inadver-
tently by the courts in an effort to best implement federal policy
under acts which do not purport to discriminate against litigants
based upon their choice of forum. The fact that the circuits differ
as to the necessary elements of a 10b-5 action, coupled with dif-
fering state blue sky laws and judicial conservatism, has created
haphazard criteria. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the
courts have chosen limitation periods based upon differing an-
swers to one or more of the following questions:
1. Does the civil liability section of the forum state's blue sky law
more closely resemble rule lOb-5, section 12(2) of the1933 Act, or
neither?
2. Does that particular circuit require scienter in a 10b-5 action?
3. Does the forum state's law of fraud require a showing of scien-
ter?
4. Is the policy of the federal securities laws best effectuated by a
longer or a shorter rule 10b-5 statute of limitations?
The difficulty of determining applicable 10b-5 limitation periods
is enhanced by the position of those courts which maintain that
a policy of stability in the laws precludes changing a settled rule
even though the basis for the rule has been undermined by judi-
cial decision (Ninth Circuit) and of other courts which cling to
theories of liability not reinforced by their own decisions (Tenth
Circuit).
82MD. CODE ANN. art. 32(A), § 34(e) (1957).
U355 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
"Because action was transferred from federal court sitting in Indiana, "this Court,
as the transferee court, must apply the forum state statute of limitations of the transferor




In section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, which is closest in practical
effect to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, since both now give private
litigants a right of action for misrepresentation or omission of
material facts in connection with securities transactions, Con-
gress determined to reduce the plaintiff's burden of proof from
that which was required by the corresponding common law ac-
tion.86 The section 12(2) plaintiff, however, is required to bring his
action within a shorter period of time than is typically required
by state limitation statutes applicable to fraud or deceit. 7 The
federal policy in the event of a misrepresentation or omission of
a material fact in connection with a securities transaction is clear:
When giving a private right of action, simplify the burden of proof
upon the plaintiff, but require the plaintiff to bring the action
within a relatively brief period of time.
There is small doubt that the elements of a rule 10b-5 cause
of action, although dealing with securities fraud, are fewer than
the elements of common law fraud 8 but are for the most part
greater than the elements of an action under section 12(2) of the
1933 Act." It would seem logical, therefore, to apply an interme-
diate limitation period to 10b-5 actions, keeping in mind the
desirability of national uniformity in application of any federal
law. The Ninth Circuit's position, that the remedial policies un-
derlying the federal securities laws militate in favor of a longer
statute of limitations in 10b-5 actions, simply cannot stand in
view of the policy expressed in the federal acts of applying a
"W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 100, at 700 (3d ed. 1964):
The elements of the tort cause of action in deceit are:
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case,
this representation must be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of defendant that the representation
is false or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis
of information to make it. This element is often given the technical name of
"scienter."
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action
in reliance upon the misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plain-
tiff, in taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
(Footnotes omitted).
"See Note supra note 13, at 283, 288, where the commentator states that "the periods
under state fraud statutes range from one year to six, with an average of four years."
(Footnotes omitted).
"Id. at 291. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Invs. Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915
(9th Cir. 1971); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 99 (6th Cir. 1967).
03 L. Loss, SEcURrrIEs REGULATION 1699-1712 (2d ed. 1961).
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relatively short statute of limitations when granting a private
right of action. Moreover, the tremendous liabilities with which
issuers and their controlling persons 0 must contend for the mak-
ing of negligent misrepresentations or omissions of material facts
(at least in the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and possibly Tenth Cir-
cuits) reinforce the argument for a shorter -limitation period in
order. to afford a degree of protection to such persons. The choice
of a limitation period for actions under rule 10b-5 should not rest
upon the resemblance test as advocated by the Eighth Circuit
since its application requires that the limitation period vary as
the blue sky law changes9' or as the necessary 10b-5 elements are
redetermined by the courts."
CONCLUSION
It would be highly desirable to create a uniform national
standard whereby all federal courts could look to the same state
law for the appropriate limitation period. The most logical limita-
tion period would be either that applied to actions in fraud or that
provided in the local blue sky law. The statute of limitations
provided in approximately two-thirds of the blue sky laws of the
various states is either 2 or 3 years. 3 The fraud limitation period
for the various states ranges from 1 year to 6 years with an average
of 4 years.94 Since the blue sky laws deal specifically with securi-
ties, since federal policy favors a shorter limitation period, and
since the 10b-5 plaintiff's burden of proof falls between that re-
quired by section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and those typically re-
quired under traditional common law fraud concepts, 5 reason
would dictate that the blue sky limitation period, falling for the
most part between the section 12(2) and common law limitation
periods, should be applied in rule 10b-5 actions. However, since
the federal policy of tolling limitation periods is applicable to rule
10b-5 actions, the period provided by the state blue sky law
should not commence to run until the fraud is or should reasona-
"See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1958) (con-
trolling person does, however, have a "good faith" defense).
"See Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Minn. 1973).
"See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (dispensing with element
of reliance in a fraud on the market situation in a private action for violation of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (1970) and rule 14a-9 promulgated there-
under).
'3See Appendix I.
"See Note, supra note 13, at 283, 288.
"See W. PRossER, supra note 86.
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bly have been discovered by the plaintiff. Where the forum state
has a blue sky limitation period running from the date of the
contract of sale, the federal tolling policy would be adopted.
Where the applicable blue sky limitation period runs from the
date of discovery, but in no event for longer than a certain num-
ber of years from the date of violation, the limitation period
should be adopted exclusively as being closest in effect to other
federal limitation periods on remedies expressly granted.
Perhaps the best argument in favor of maintenance of the
status quo on rule 10b-5 limitation periods is that the federal
securities laws are currently being recodified under the direction
and supervision of Professor Loss and that the 10b-5 limitation
problem will be resolved in the new law. However, it is presently
contemplated that this proposed legislation will not be submitted
to Congress until 1976 or 1977,96 and, of course, prompt passage
or passage at all cannot be assured. In the meantime, both 10b-5
plaintiffs and defendants should be entitled to rely upon a uni-
formly applied rule governing determination and commencement
of limitation periods which will not fluctuate with changes in the
law of rule 10b-5 or in the substantive blue sky laws of the states.
"Loss, Introductory Memorandum to Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Federal Securities
Code, reprinted in 199 BNA SEC. RFG. & L. REP. D-1 (April 25, 1973).
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ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 45(e) (1958)
ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.220(f) (1962)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2004 (1956)
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256(e) (1966)
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25507(a) (West 1955)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-21(5) (1963)
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 35-346(e) (1967)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7323(e) (1973)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.21(1) (1965)
GA. CODE ANN. § 97-114(c) (1973)
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-20(a) (1968)
IDAHO CODE § 30-1446(3) (1967)
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.13(d) (1974)
IND. CODE § 2-1-19(e) (1971)
IOWA CODE § 502.23 (1974)
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268(c) (1967)
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.480(3) (1972)
LA. REV. STAT. § 51:715(E) (1950)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 881(4) (1964)
MD. ANN. CODE art. 32(A), § 34(e) (1957)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 410(2)(e)
(1972)
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 451.810(e) (1948)
MINN. STAT. § 80A.23(7) (1971)
MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-31(b) (1972)
Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.411(e) (1969)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1118(3) (1943)
NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.200(5) (1971)
N.J. REv. STAT. § 49:3-71(e) (1937)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-31(a) (1953)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-22 (1943)




























OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Page
1964)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 408(e)(1971)
ORE. REV. STAT. § 59.115(5) (1971)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-504(a),(b) (1974)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-313 (1962)
S.D. CODE § 47-31-137 (1967)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1645(A) (1953)
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(C)
(1965)
44. Utah 2 years UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(5) (1953)
45. Vermont 2 years VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4225 (1971)
46. Virginia 2 years VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522(d) (1950)
47. Washington 3 years WASH. RED. CODE ANN. § 21.20.430(3) (1950)
48. West Virginia 1 year W. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-1-18 (1931)
49. Wisconsin 3 years WIs. STAT. ANN. § 551-59(5) (1974)
50. Wyoming 2 years Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 17-117.22(2)(e) (1957)
*(1) Or one year after discovery, whichever expires first.
**(2) Three years for fraud or one year after discovery, whichever expires first;
two years for registration violations or one year after discovery, whichever expires first.

